EVENT
Iraq War1
Also known as: Operation Iraqi Freedom
Date: 2003
From: Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy.
On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda terrorists struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In its wake President George W. Bush proclaimed a global war against terrorists and those who aided and abetted them. While the initial focus of American military action was on the Taliban government of Afghanistan, many within the Bush administration lobbied for expanding the war against terrorism to include Iraq. Numbering among them were Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. All served President George H. W. Bush during the Persian Gulf War when the decision was made not to forcibly remove Saddam Hussein from power. Secretary of State Colin Powell was also a member of that administration, but he alone of these individuals opposed war with Iraq.
President George W. Bush did not endorse including military action against Iraq in America’s immediate plans for a war against terrorism. However, once the war in Afghanistan was successfully concluded, he signaled that an expansion in the war against terrorism was about to begin. In his January 29, 2002, State of the Union address Bush identified Iraq, Iran and North Korea as comprising an axis of evil. Additional evidence that the United States was about to go on the offensive came with the release of a new national security doctrine rejecting deterrence and emphasizing preemption, the logic being to strike an enemy before it became too powerful.
The key issue argued diplomatically and politically in 2002 was whether or not the United States would seek United Nations approval for military action against Iraq and, if requested, whether it would be given. The leading advocates of military action against Iraq asserted that the United States could act unilaterally. Not only did the United States have a right to self-defense, Iraq was still in violation of UN resolutions issued after the Persian Gulf War. President Bush decided to move forward and seek formal international support for military action. In a speech delivered at the UN on the anniversary of the September 11 attacks, Bush challenged the UN to face up to the “grave and gathering danger” of Iraq or stand aside and allow the United States to act. In following this line of action Bush was endorsing Powell’s position and overriding the objections of Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz.
Iraq War1
Also known as: Operation Iraqi Freedom
Date: 2003
From: Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy.
On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda terrorists struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In its wake President George W. Bush proclaimed a global war against terrorists and those who aided and abetted them. While the initial focus of American military action was on the Taliban government of Afghanistan, many within the Bush administration lobbied for expanding the war against terrorism to include Iraq. Numbering among them were Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. All served President George H. W. Bush during the Persian Gulf War when the decision was made not to forcibly remove Saddam Hussein from power. Secretary of State Colin Powell was also a member of that administration, but he alone of these individuals opposed war with Iraq.
President George W. Bush did not endorse including military action against Iraq in America’s immediate plans for a war against terrorism. However, once the war in Afghanistan was successfully concluded, he signaled that an expansion in the war against terrorism was about to begin. In his January 29, 2002, State of the Union address Bush identified Iraq, Iran and North Korea as comprising an axis of evil. Additional evidence that the United States was about to go on the offensive came with the release of a new national security doctrine rejecting deterrence and emphasizing preemption, the logic being to strike an enemy before it became too powerful.
The key issue argued diplomatically and politically in 2002 was whether or not the United States would seek United Nations approval for military action against Iraq and, if requested, whether it would be given. The leading advocates of military action against Iraq asserted that the United States could act unilaterally. Not only did the United States have a right to self-defense, Iraq was still in violation of UN resolutions issued after the Persian Gulf War. President Bush decided to move forward and seek formal international support for military action. In a speech delivered at the UN on the anniversary of the September 11 attacks, Bush challenged the UN to face up to the “grave and gathering danger” of Iraq or stand aside and allow the United States to act. In following this line of action Bush was endorsing Powell’s position and overriding the objections of Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz.
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Within a week of Bush’s address Iraq promised to permit weapons inspectors “without conditions.” At the UN, this announcement was hailed as “an indispensable first step.” The Bush administration dismissed it as a “tactic that will fail.” Iraq’s offer led Russia, France, and others to question whether a new resolution was now needed. Opposition arose in the Security Council to the expansive language of the American draft resolution that gave the United States full and automatic authority to use force if Iraq did not comply and the right to conduct its own inspections. An attempt at a compromise in October failed. The Bush administration was insisting that American military action could not be held hostage to a Security Council vote. France argued that only the Security Council could make a decision on going to war. The revised U.S. draft resolution did not request UN authorization for military action nor did it contain language that made military action automatic. But it did call for intrusive weapons inspections and warned of “severe consequences” should Iraq fail to comply. It also held that Iraq was in “material breach” of its disarmament obligations. A successful compromise was not crafted until November 8, 2002, when the Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1441, giving Iraq 30 days to give a current, full, and complete report on all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction program. UN weapons inspectors were to update the Security Council in 60 days. Iraq accepted the UN resolution on November 13. On November 18 UN inspectors began arriving in Baghdad.
Iraq’s report to the UN was submitted on December 7, 2002. It was 1,200 pages long. UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix judged it to contain little new information and that it was “not enough to create confidence” that Iraq was disarming. Blix filed a similar report in early January regarding Iraq’s compliance, but he also indicated that inspectors had not yet found any “smoking guns.” Subsequent reports referenced Iraq’s increased willingness to participate in the inspection process but continued to identify failings in the quality of its participation.
Unhappy with the pace and tenor of the verification process, in December the Bush administration set late January as the decision deadline for Iraq and began moving forces into the region. An estimated 125,000 American troops had already been ordered to the Persian Gulf when on January 20 France indicated that it would block any new Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. The Bush administration then repeated its position that it was willing to go to war without UN support. Intense diplomatic maneuvering returned to the UN in late February when the United States and its principal ally, Great Britain, indicated that they would soon introduce a new resolution that would declare Iraq to be in “further material breach” of UN orders to disarm. This brought forward renewed opposition from Germany and France. They advocated sending more weapons inspectors to Iraq along with UN troops so that they might gain access to all desired sites. On March 5, Germany, France, Russia, and China all announced that they would vote against any resolution authorizing war with Iraq. Once again President Bush indicated that he was prepared to go ahead without UN support.
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In preparing to go to war without a supporting UN resolution, Bush moved to put together an alliance of supportive states. This grouping became known as the “coalition of the willing.” Prominent among its members were the former communist states of East Europe that were seeking membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Rumsfeld collectively referred to them as the “new Europe.” Shortly after the war began the administration claimed that the coalition of the willing had grown to 46 states, exceeding the number of states that supported the United States in the Persian Gulf War. The extent of many of these contributions, however, was quite limited. Six states—Palau, Costa Rica, Iceland, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and the Solomon Islands—had no army.
Absent in this coalition was NATO. As early as September 2002 Rumsfeld indicated that he did not see NATO as having an important role to play in a war with Iraq. The American position changed in November when on the eve of a NATO summit President Bush invoked the image of Nazi Germany and urged NATO to take a stand against Saddam Hussein. Germany and France, however, remained opposed and blocked NATO action on the American request for support. French president Jacques Chirac asserted that “war is not inevitable” and that there should be no rush to a decision. This action prompted Rumsfeld to label France and Germany as part of the “old Europe.” Their opposition continued in February 2003 when they opposed Turkey’s request for NATO help under Article 4 of the NATO Treaty that pledges states to come to the defense of those whose security was threatened. They argued that it was Turkey’s actions that would force the crisis into war, thus invalidating Article 4.
Turkey was going to be a key participant in the war against Iraq. It would serve as a transhipment site for war matériel and a staging point for a northern invasion of Iraq. In the end this did not happen, and Turkey largely stayed on the sidelines. Problems in both Turkey and the United States contributed to this result. On the U.S. side, the Bush administration was unable to meet Turkey’s demands for economic assistance and postwar security guarantees. On the Turkish side, a newly elected Turkish government was unable to muster the political majority necessary to overcome widespread domestic opposition to the war.
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President Bush had also moved to establish a basis for unilateral action by obtaining congressional support for war. Bush turned to Congress for support reluctantly. As late as August 2003 signs from the Bush administration suggested that it did not feel that the formal support of Congress was necessary in order to conduct a war in Iraq. Bush’s pubic statements only went so far as to indicate the he would consult with legislators, something that fell short of obtaining their approval. Such support was not guaranteed. In early September, Senator Larry Craig (R-Idaho), chair of the Senate Republican Policy Committee and a strong Bush supporter, indicated that he was not prepared to vote for war at the time. Pressed by leaders in both parties to obtain congressional support, President Bush asked for such authorization on September 19. The White House–drafted resolution authorized the president to “use all means that he determines, including force,” in order to enforce the UN Security Council resolutions, defend the national interest of the United States against the threats posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region.
Congress was supportive of the proposal, but many felt it was far too open-ended an endorsement of presidential war-making powers and was reminiscent of the situation that existed during the Vietnam War. Others continued to call for a multilateral approach to the war. In early October the Bush administration reached a compromise with Congress. The revised resolution was passed on October 10 by a vote of 77-23 in the Senate and 296-139 in the House. The resolution supported efforts by the president to obtain action by the Security Council but then authorized the use of force. Borrowing language from the War Powers Resolution it required the president to notify Congress no later than 48 hours after exercising his authority and required that he report at least once every 60 days to the Congress.
The diplomatic maneuvering leading up to war entered into the endgame phase on March 16 when the United States, Great Britain, and Spain held a one-hour summit conference in the Azores. It ended with President Bush issuing an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to go into exile or face military action. The next evening President Bush addressed the nation and gave Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave Iraq. On Tuesday, March 18, Saddam Hussein rejected Bush’s ultimatum.
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The first blow in the war was struck in the early morning hours of March 20 when President Bush ordered a decapitation air strike against the Iraqi leadership. U.S. intelligence sources reported that they believed Saddam Hussein and one or both of his sons were inside one of the bunkers targeted in this attack but were unsure if they were killed. Throughout the war Saddam Hussein would appear in broadcasts urging Iraqis to resist the “aggressors.” American intelligence was unable to confirm when the tapes had been made or even if it was Saddam Hussein making the speeches. The ground war began early in the evening on March 20 as American and British forces crossed into Iraq from Kuwait. Their progress was uneven. American troops met with little effective resistance, but the British encountered stiffer resistance, especially around Basra. As the invasion supply line grew to more than 250 miles, voices of concern were expressed that U.S. troops were becoming overly vulnerable to attacks by marauding Iraqi forces. A central premise of the war plan was that the United States would be welcomed as a liberator. This was now in doubt. In late March a week-long pause in the ground offensive took place as Pentagon officials reassessed their strategy. When the offensive resumed, American ground forces rapidly advanced on the elite Republican Guard units defending Baghdad. Baghdad fell on April 9.
Along with the ground war, the United States pursued a robust air war. After the initial decapitation strike the air force engaged in “shock and awe” bombing that was designed to destroy Iraq’s willingness to resist. As American troops advanced on Baghdad, another attempt was made to kill Saddam Hussein by dropping four 2,000-pound “bunker buster” bombs on one of his fortified underground command centers. As with the earlier decapitation strike, intelligence officials were unable to confirm if he had been killed.
On May 1, aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, President Bush declared victory in the war in Iraq. Celebrations of peace were shortlived, as looting and anarchy soon became the order of the day. American forces found themselves engaged in a series of highly charged encounters with Iraqi civilians in several Iraqi cities. In a very short period of time the United States had gone from liberator to enemy. Tens of thousands took to the streets in Baghdad to protest the U.S. presence; 10 civilians were killed in Mosul, and 13 were killed in Fallujah. Angry Iraqis, for example, blamed the United States for fuel shortages and power outages. Press reports in mid-May 2003 noted that Iraqis were tracking down Ba’ath Party members who were affiliated with Saddam Hussein’s regime and killing them because they felt the United States was being too lenient on them. By mid-May congressional concerns had grown to the point where Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld promised that an additional 15,000 troops would be sent to Iraq. At the time, about 142,000 troops were in Iraq, about 49,000 of them in and around Baghdad.
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American officials were particularly unprepared for the manner in which Shi’ites, who make up 60 percent of Iraq’s population, were able to organize themselves for political action. Shi’ite clerics spoke out in fervent tones against the United States. The deputy leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iran said, “[T]he American presence is unacceptable and there is no justification for staying in Iraq.” Shi’ite demonstrators, who in some cases numbered in the tens of thousands, chanted “[N]o to imperialism, no to Israel, no to America, and no to Saddam.” Such pronouncements led some in the Senate to openly worry about the establishment of a theocracy in Iraq.
Before the fighting ended, the Bush administration announced the appointment of retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner to oversee reconstruction efforts as head of the Pentagon’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. The growing violence in Iraq led to a sudden change in plans, and in early May career diplomat L. Paul Bremer was named special envoy and civil administrator in Iraq, placing him above Garner in the chain of command. One of the key decisions American officials faced was which Iraqis to work with in their reconstruction efforts. Initially the United States indicated that it would allow Ba’ath Party members to continue to hold government positions in the reconstruction process. Some 2 million Iraqis were members of the Ba’ath Party under Saddam Hussein, and this initial announcement indicated that only the 55 “most wanted” were by definition excluded from holding office. This decision angered many in Iraq, and soon the United States reversed itself, banning 15,000–30,000 party members from holding jobs in a new government. American authorities also faced a decision regarding how closely to rely upon the Iraqi exile community in the West. Working in favor of giving them an important role in postwar Iraq is the fact that unlike local Iraqi leaders, they are known figures possessing established relationships with U.S. authorities. Working against giving them an important role is their lack of contacts and ties within Iraq that are important for making things happen on the ground.
A final cost analysis of the Iraq War will not be done for some time. The United States has indicated that, unlike in previous conflicts, it will not do a civilian casualty count. The economic costs are also uncertain. In late March the Bush administration submitted a request to Congress for $74.7 billion for the next five months: $63 billion for the war itself, $8 billion in relief funds, and $4 billion for homeland security. In May one think tank estimated that $1 million per day was being spent on reconstruction. The Bush administration, through the Agency for International Development, was also earmarking money for private firms to engage in reconstruction. Especially controversial was the decision to allow some firms, including Halliburton Co., for which Vice President Dick Cheney once served as chief executive officer, to obtain these contracts without going through a competitive bidding process. Early estimates placed the value of some of these projects at $900 million. Another scenario pegged Hailliburton’s potential profit from Iraqi reconstruction at $7 billion.
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“In our minds, she’s already made it a success,” Young said. “She’s put Flint on the map for something that’s positive. She’s a talent, and she’s one of many, so we just want to celebrate that, and that’s what we’re doing.”3
1. “Iraq War.” Staff Sergeant Cherie A. Thurlby. U.S. Department of Defense. Facts On File, Inc. American History Online. www.fofweb.com.
2. Re/Max Performance Realty. http://performancerealty.michigan.remax.com/default.aspx (28 February 2007).
3. Doug Pullen. “City Rallies to Support LaKisha.” The Flint Journal on Michigan Live, 28 February 2007, http://www.mlive.com/news/fljournal/index.ssf?/base/news-42/1172677827264300.xml&coll=5(28 February 2007)
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